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Ingber: Navigable-in-Fact Doctrine

PADDLING IN MR. POTTER’S BACKYARD: NAVIGATING
NEW YORK’S NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT DOCTRINE
Matthew Ingber*

I.

INTRODUCTION

New York’s common law navigable-in-fact doctrine, applicable to non-tidal waterways passing through private property, often
brings conflict among the interests of landowners and the public.1 In
these cases, generally, members of the public have entered private
land to use the non-tidal waterway, leading landowners to bring an
action for trespass.2 The public response; however, is that no trespass
was committed because the waterway is navigable-in-fact and, therefore, subject to a public easement to use the waterway for transportation.3 Accordingly, the outcome of these cases depends on a judicial
determination as to whether the waterway is navigable-in-fact, meaning that the waterway is subject to a public easement, thus negating
the landowner’s trespass cause of action.4
The navigable-in-fact doctrine is a remnant of English common law and New York courts have recognized this doctrine since at
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1
See, e.g., Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866); Adirondack League Club, Inc.
v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of Thayer Lake LLC. v.
Brown, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015); Dale v. Chisholm, 889
N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009).
2
See supra note 1.
3
Supra note 1.
4
Supra note 1.
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least 1805.5 Traditionally, New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine
examined whether a non-tidal waterway had or was susceptible of
having practical commercial utility.6 As stated by the New York
Court of Appeals 1866 decision in Morgan v. King,7 the “public ha[s]
a right of way in every stream which is capable, in its natural state
and its ordinary volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit
for market, the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the
soil upon its banks.”8 However, as waterways have become less
commercial in nature,9 New York and other jurisdictions10 have expanded their navigable-in-fact doctrine by permitting evidence of a
waterway’s “capacity for recreational use.”11
Evidence of recreational use in a navigability determination
provides a needed update to the navigable-in-fact approach because it
recognizes that rivers “are no longer primarily subjects of commer-

5

Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458.
7
35 N.Y. 454 (1866).
8
Id. at 459. Under New York’s statutory Navigation Law, “navigable-in-fact” is
defined as a waterway that is:
Navigable in its natural or unimproved condition, affording a
channel for useful commerce of a substantial and permanent
character conducted in the customary mode of trade and travel on
water. A theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious and unprofitable is not sufficient, but to be
navigable in fact a lake or stream must have practical usefulness
to the public as a highway for transportation.
N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2016). While this definition is similar to the
one established in Morgan v King, the statute does not apply to waterways whose
beds and banks are privately owned. See infra Section II. In addition, the statutory
Navigation Law applies to “the use of navigable waters of the state,” N.Y. NAV.
LAW § 1 (McKinney 2016), and the “[n]avigable waters of the state” includes “all
lakes, rivers, streams and waters within the boundaries of the state and not privately
owned . . . .” Id. § 2(4). Thus, common law principles—and not the Navigation
Law—control when analyzing whether a non-tidal waterway over private property
is or is not navigable-in-fact and thus subject to a public navigable easement.
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 508. However, the Navigation Law helped
persuade the New York Court of Appeals when it held that evidence of recreational
use of a waterway may be considered in a navigable-in-fact analysis. Adirondack
League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195; see infra Section III.B.ii.a.
9
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
10
See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980); State ex rel v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
11
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
6
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cial exploitation.”12 However, by including recreational transportation, New York courts may have broadened13 the category of waterways subject to the public navigable easement, which may, in turn,
“destabilize long-established expectations as to the nature of private
ownership.”14 In particular, the New York Court of Appeals decision
in Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club15 (ALC) and a recent
opinion by the Third Department in Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v.
Brown,16 have put the scope of the navigable-in-fact doctrine into
question. Both cases involved paddlers who entered private property
and argued that the waterway was navigable-in-fact, and therefore,
subject to a public easement.17 In both cases, the court considered the
recreational use of the waterway in its navigable-in-fact analysis.18
The courts, however, stated that including recreational use “neither
altered nor enlarged the applicable common-law analysis and was in
line with the traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river
has a practical utility for trade or travel.”19 This proposition is doubtful. As discussed throughout this Article, the manner in which recre12

Id. at 1195.
The court, in Adirondack League Club held that “evidence of the river’s capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional test of navigability, that is,
whether a river has practical utility for trade or travel.” 706 N.E.2d at 1194. The
court then stated it was not “broaden[ing] the standard for navigability-in-fact, but
[was] merely recogniz[ing] that recreational use fits within in.” Id. at 1195.
14
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512 n.5; c.f. Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204 (N.Y. 1997) (stating that accepting defendant’s position
“would precipitate serious destabilizing effects on property ownership and precedents”).
15
706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
16
1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
17
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193; Friends of Thayer Lake, 1
N.Y.S.3d at 506.
18
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of
Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
19
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509 (quoting Adirondack League Club,
Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194). It is debatable whether New York courts would have
considered recreational use as a practical utility in their navigable-in-fact analysis
based on (1) the emphasis that early New York cases placed on commercial utility;
and (2) that other jurisdictions were already including recreational use in their navigability analysis as early as 1871, while pre-twentieth century New York cases fail
to even mention recreational use of waterways. Id. See, e.g., Attorney General v.
Woods, 108 Mass. 436, 440 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1871) (“If water is navigable for pleasure boating, it must be regarded as navigable water, though no craft has ever been
upon it for the purposes of trade or agriculture.”).
13
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ational use evidence has been analyzed, beginning with the Court of
Appeals decision in ALC, has improperly enlarged the navigable-infact doctrine and is not in line with its traditional commercial utility
foundations.
This Article will examine the navigable-in-fact doctrine as
applied in New York with a focus on the types of evidence required
for non-tidal waterways to be declared navigable. In addition, the
Article will discuss, among others, the decisions in ALC and Friends
of Thayer Lake LLC in connection with whether recreational use
alone can support a navigability determination. Although both decisions did not expressly make such a holding, their reasoning suggests
that evidence of recreational use—without a showing of commercial
utility—is enough for a court to find a waterway navigable.20 Importantly, the navigable-in-fact standard has changed after these decisions. Instead of the requirements set forth in Morgan, it is probable
that the evidence now needed to declare a waterway navigable-in-fact
include: (1) whether a waterway in its natural state and ordinary volume can permit commercial activity21 or (2) whether “substantially
unobstructed travel on [a waterway] can occur periodically or seasonally.”22 Accordingly, a court will find that a waterway has practical public utility upon satisfying one of these factors, which, in turn,
will lead to a determination that a waterway is navigable-in-fact.23
The proponent of the navigable easement will also be able to meet his
or her burden by proffering evidence of recreational use, such as
kayaking or canoeing, to satisfy either of the two aforementioned
practical utility criteria.24
Section II of the Article considers navigable waterways generally by first examining English common law. It then compares waterways that are navigable-in-law and navigable-in-fact. Section III
20

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Friends of
Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
21
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
22
Id.
23
For example, the court in Adirondack League Club first determined that the
evidence did not establish that the subject waterway in its natural state and ordinary
volume have the capacity for commercial activity. Id. at 1196. Rather than ending
its analysis, the court then examined whether the waterway could support “substantially unobstructed travel” either seasonally or periodically. Id. at 1197.
24
See, e.g., Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509, 511 (finding that recreational kayaking is sufficient to establish that a waterway can support uninterrupted
travel and that it has the capacity for trade).
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examines New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine, starting with a
comprehensive discussion of New York’s navigable-in-fact rule of
law and the evidence required to establish that a non-tidal waterway
is navigable. It then analyzes New York case law beginning with the
Court of Appeals decision in Morgan v. King followed by its progeny. This analysis seeks to achieve two objectives. First, it shows that
including recreational use as a factor in a navigability determination
is consistent with precedent because New York courts have always
taken a pragmatic approach to navigability-in-fact law. This is exemplified by the court in Morgan breaking English precedent to
adopt a rule of law that specifically addressed the needs and concerns
of New Yorkers at that time. Second, examining New York precedent reveals that there was originally a focus on practical commercial
utility when deciding whether a waterway was navigable-in-fact.
However, recent decisions by the courts in ALC and Friends of
Thayer Lake have extended the navigable-in-fact doctrine whereby
evidence of recreational use alone is now enough for a waterway to
be deemed navigable without considering commercial utility. Finally, the Article concludes that the recent pattern by New York courts
of expanding the navigable-in-fact doctrine to include recreational
use leaves landowners with an expectation that waterways situated on
their property are subject to navigable public easements. It is unlikely that this judicial pattern will change nor is it probable for the legislature to intervene as it is New York’s policy to preserve water resources that the state holds in trust, which includes a duty to
maximize their enjoyment.
II.

NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS: NAVIGABLE-IN-LAW AND
NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT

A public easement over navigable waterways is rooted in the
public trust doctrine and English common law.25 Under English
common law, navigable waterways included only those waters “in
25

Timothy J. Zeilman, Connecticut by Canoe: Navigability in the Nutmeg State,
84 CONN. B.J. 305, 305-06 (2010); HENRY JOHN WASTELL COULSON & URQUHART
ATWELL FORBES, THE LAW RELATING TO WATERS, SEA, TIDAL, AND INLAND 444
(1880) (stating the Crown owns the bed of navigable waterways “for the benefit of
the [public], and [the waterway] cannot be used in any manner so as to derogate
from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to the subjects
of the realm”) [hereinafter COULSON & FORBES].
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which the tide flows and reflows; all others are not navigable.”26
These tidal waterways, sometimes referred to as navigable-in-law,
which were owned by the king. The king who “held the beds and
waters in trust for the public, with all citizens having access to and
use of the common resource.”27 Importantly, navigable-in-fact waterways, whether under English common law or New York law, provide the public with: (1) the right to use the waterway “for the purpose of passage or transportation”28 and (2) the right to take fish from
the waters.29
On the other hand, those waterways that English law deemed
not navigable (non-tidal water) belonged “to the owner of the adjacent soil” rather than the king.30 According to Chancellor Kent’s understanding of Lord Hale’s treatise, de jure mairs, “fresh [water] rivers, as well as those which ebb and flow, may be under the servitude
of the public interest, and may be of common or public use for the
carriage of boats, &c. and in that sense may be regarded as common
highways by water.”31 In addition, and unlike those waterways
deemed navigable-in-law, a waterway that is navigable-in-fact does
not “divest the owners of the adjacent banks of their exclusive rights
to the fisheries therein.”32
Based on these principles, the English common law distin26

Morgan, 354 N.Y. at 458 (emphasis added). “The common law of England
considers a river, in which the tide ebbs and flows, an arm of the sea, as navigable,
and devoted to the public use, for all purposes, as well for navigation as for fishing.” Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90, 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). For example,
in Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), New York’s highest
court was presented with the issue of whether the defendants committed a nuisance
when they constructed a mill on the Hudson River. Id. at 307. Chancellor Kent
stated that “[t]he Hudson at Stillwater is a fresh river, not navigable in the common
law sense of the term, for the tide does not ebb and flow at that place.” Id. at 318
(opinion of Kent, Ch.) (emphases in original).
27
Zeilman, supra note 25 at 305.
28
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458.
29
See supra note 14; Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 203 (stating that the
common law did not “divest the owners of the adjacent banks of their exclusive
rights to the fisheries therein”). The public easement in navigable-in-fact waterways, however, does not include the right to fish. See infra text accompanying note
29.
30
Morgan, 35 N.Y. 458.
31
Palmer, 3 Cai at 319 (opinion of Kent, Ch.); see also Maureen E. Brady,
“Navigability”: Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1421-23 (2015).
32
Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 203.
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guished between tidal and non-tidal waterways. The soil of tidal waterways was owned by the king and held in public trust, and the public had an easement/servitude to use the water for transportation and
fishing.33 In contrast, English law considered fresh water to be nonnavigable and the adjacent property owner, rather than the king,
owned the soil beneath the water.34 But even with non-tidal waters,
the public, although not having a right to fish in non-tidal water, still
retained servitude to use these waterways for transportation of “boats,
lighters or rafts.”35
III.

NEW YORK’S NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT DOCTRINE

After the American Revolution, the “people of the State in
their right of sovereignty succeeded to the royal title” over the waterways.36 American courts continued to apply the English common
law to tidal waters, but the English definition of navigable waterway
was too limited due to the thousands of non-tidal rivers, streams, and
lakes of North America that were actually or susceptible of being
used as highways for commerce.37 Accordingly, American courts
began to modify the English navigability standard by expanding the
scope of the public easement to include non-tidal waterways.38 The
remainder of this Section examines New York’s navigable-in-fact
precedent and focuses on the type of evidence that will support a navigable-in-fact determination.
A.

New York’s Navigable-in-Fact Rule

For non-tidal waterways located on private property to be
navigable-in-fact, the “paramount concern is the capacity of the river
33

Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458.
Id.
35
Id.; see, e.g., COULSON & FORBES, supra note 25, at 78 (stating that “the right
of navigation is . . . similar to the right which the public [has] to passage along a
public road, and involves no right of property in the bed or banks.”).
36
People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); c.f.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. Law § 15-0103(1) (McKinney 2016) (“The sovereign power to regulate and control the water resources of this state ever since its establishment has been and now is vested exclusively in the state of New York . . . ”).
37
Zeilman, supra note 25, at 306-08.
38
See Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (expanding New York’s navigable-in-fact doctrine
from the English common law to include waterways capable of floating logs in a
condition fit for market).
34
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for transport, whether for trade or travel.”39 This practical utility
standard requires the proponent of the navigable public easement to
demonstrate that the waterway has “actual practical use or evidence
of capacity for practical use.”40 In that connection, practical utility
for a waterway’s capacity for trade or transport is established if the
river:
1. Is actually or is capable;41
2. “In its natural state;
3. And in its ordinary volume of water;42
4. Of transporting in a condition fit for market the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the soil
upon its banks”43 or has the “capacity for recreational
use”44;
5. For a sufficient length of time during the year so that
the waterway has practical public utility.45
In addition, it is not necessary that property being transported
be carried in vessels.46 If it is so far navigable or floatable,47 in its

39

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195; Mohawk Valley Ski Club
v. Town of Duanesbug, 757 N.Y.S.2d 357, 304 A.D.2d 881, 883 (App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 2003).
40
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194. See also The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (stating that rivers are “navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted”).
41
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. Evidence of a river’s actual use or evidence of a river’s capacity can be established by, inter alia, “experts in geology, hydrology, economics, fluvial geomorphology, and even expert canoers and river guides.” Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196.
42
As to this factor, the court in Morgan only required that a waterway’s “navigable capacity ordinarily continue a sufficient length of time to make it useful as a
highway” for it to be deemed “subject to the public easement.” 35 N.Y. at 459.
43
Id.
44
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
45
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459; Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 119697.
46
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
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natural state and its ordinary capacity, as to be of public use in the
transportation of property, the public claim to such use ought to be
liberally supported.48
Assuming the five factors above are satisfied, this alone does
not establish that a waterway is navigable-in-fact because “[t]he public right to use navigable waters does not entitle the public to cross
private land for access to navigable waters.”49 In addition, “the existence or absence of [multiple] termini at and from which the public
may enter or leave the waterway“50 may be determinative as to
whether there is or is not a public easement.51 For example, in Hanigan v. State,52 the Appellate Division, Third Department held that a
pond was not navigable-in-fact because it lacked multiple termini.53
Therefore, the court found that the pond lacked public utility for
transportation because “the canoe and small boats that used Stewart
Pond traveled nowhere” as there was only one navigable access

47

For a discussion of the court rationale in Morgan for extending English common law by permitting a waterway to be declared navigable-in-fact based on its capacity to float logs to market, see infra Section III.B.
48
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (emphasis added).
49
Hanigan v. State, 629 N.Y.S.2d 509, 511 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995). In
Friends of Thayer Lake, for example, the “plaintiffs’ property is bounded” to the
north by a wilderness area. 1 N.Y.S.3d at 506. The wilderness contained two lakes
and permitted paddlers to “travel across a network of lakes, ponds, streams, and canoe carry trails” that ultimately encroached onto the waterways situated on the northerly boundary of plaintiff’s property. Id. This trail would later be known as the
“Lila Traverse Section of the Whitney Loop.” Id. From 1851 to 1997, the wilderness area was privately owned; thus, paddlers lacked a public access point and
could not use the Lila Traverse and thus use plaintiffs’ waterways without first
trespassing on the wilderness area. Id. In 1998; however, New York State purchased the wilderness area, thereby permitting kayakers to enter the two lakes located on the now public wilderness area and paddle along the Lila Traverse without
having to first cross private land before reaching the navigable waterways situated
on plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 506, 512.
50
John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the Navigable Streams of New York, 6
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 517-18 (1989); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823,
826 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1960); Mohawk Valley Ski Club, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
51
Compare Hanigan, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (“[T]he absence of a second access is
further evidence that the pond is not suitable for trade, commerce, or travel.”), with
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512 (finding the waterway at issue to be
navigable, in part, because the private property in which the waterway is situated
on “adjoins public property at both of its termini”).
52
629 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995).
53
Id. at 512.
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point.54
The public easement afforded to navigable-in-fact waterways
also “carries with it the incidental privilege to make use, when absolutely necessary of the bed and banks, including the right to portage
on riparian lands.”55 Therefore, even if the ability to travel along the
waterway is interrupted by “occasional natural obstructions,” this will
not prevent a court from declaring a waterway navigable and subject
to a public easement.56 For example, in Friends of Thayer Lake, the
Third Department found that neither the recreational kayaker’s “relatively short portage around the waterway’s rapids nor the presence of
other incidental obstacles such as beaver dams and fallen trees rendered the waterway nonnavigable.”57
Finally, a judicial determination that a waterway located on
private property is navigable-in-fact does not amount to a taking under New York’s constitution.58 As previously stated, the navigablein-fact doctrine is a remnant of the English public trust doctrine and
after the America Revolution, New York and the other original
twelve states, “inherited ownership of the public trust waters within
its boundaries from the king.”59 In that connection, a determination
that a waterway is navigable-in-fact is that [the waterway] has always been open to the public in that character, even though the riparian owners may not have
believed it to be, and no trespass was committed by a
traveler who navigated upon it before a court ruled
upon its navigability.60
B.

Morgan v. King - Expanding the English Common
Law to Satisfy Commercial Needs

The 1866 New York Court of Appeals decision in Morgan v.
King examined the implications of non-tidal waterways running over
54

Id.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
56
Id. at 1197; People ex rel. Eric R.R. v. State Tax Comm’n, 43 N.Y.S.2d 189,
191 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1943).
57
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510 (quotation altered).
58
Douglaston Manor v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204-05 (N.Y. 1997); Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196.
59
See Zeilman, supra note 25, at 305-06.
60
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 508.
55
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private property, and has become the seminal case in the State in
connection with the navigable-in-fact doctrine. The significance of
the decision is two-fold. First, it established New York’s common
law navigable-in-fact rule of law.61 Second, if not equally important,
the Court of Appeals broke away from the English common law by
adopting a rule that considered the “peculiar character of [New
York’s] streams” and the important utility in transporting people and
goods to market.62
In Morgan, the defendants owned land over a portion of the
non-tidal Raquette River that passed along their property and were
concededly the riparian owners.63 The defendants, believing they
were lawfully exercising their right to use their land, constructed a
dam along the river, which ultimately obstructed the passage of the
plaintiffs’ logs that were being floated down the stream.64
The issue was “whether the Raquette River is, of public right,
a common highway, at the point where its waters are obstructed by
the defendants’ dam.”65 The court explained that if the water over the
defendants’ property were subject to a public easement, meaning navigable-in-fact, then the defendants’ use of their property (building the
dam) would make them liable for interfering with the plaintiffs’ right,
as members of the public, to use the waterway for transportation.66
To answer this question, the court analyzed the characteristics
of the 161 mile long Raquette River, paying particular attention to the
section of the river between Colton and Raymondsville, the site of
defendants’ dam.67 The first twenty miles of the river, from its mouth
to Raymondsville, was boatable and had already been declared a navigable public highway.68 For the next fourteen miles, from Ray61

Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
Id. at 458. The New York Court of Appeals in Adirondack League Club, Inc.
v. Sierra Club used similar reasoning when including recreational use as a factor in
the navigable-in-fact analysis by recognizing that rivers no longer serve as “subjects of commercial exploitation and gain but instead are valued in their own right
as a means of travel.” Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d
1192, 1195 (N.Y. 1998).
63
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 456, 458.
64
Id. at 456.
65
Id.
66
Id. (finding that if “the river is not a common highway,” then the river is not
navigable and the defendants would not be liable to the plaintiffs for committing
the tort of nuisance).
67
Id. 455-60.
68
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 455-56.
62
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mondsville to Potsdam, “the bed of the river is rocky, and rises two
hundred and fifty feet, and the stream is rapid and rough.”69 From
Potsdam to Colton, which consisted of the next nine miles, the river’s
bed would rise four hundred feet.70
The court’s analysis began with a clear departure from English common law.71 Under English law, a river is navigable-in-fact
when “boats, lighters or rafts may be floated to market”72; nothing
under English law provided for floating logs.73 Accordingly, had the
court relied on English law, the Raquette River would not have been
navigable because it was not capable of carrying to market “the products of the forest or mines, or the tillage of the soil upon its bank” in
any of the three types of craft previously mentioned.74
The court found that limiting the evidence to the capacity of a
river to float boats, lighters, and rafts was too restrictive given “the
peculiar character of [New York’s] streams, and the commerce for
which they may be used.”75 Thus, English law did not fit the needs
of New Yorkers and the court agreed with the plaintiffs that “the natural capacity of the river to float sawlogs and timber, in single pieces,
to market, in seasons of high water” was of significant public utility.76 It rationalized this policy determination by emphasizing that expanding the navigable-in-fact criteria was commercially necessary.77
For example, had the court not expanded the English law and instead
limited the public easement to “navigation by boats or rafts,” then
there would be no avenue for New York’s valuable products, primarily timber, to reach the market.78
The Court of Appeals then established a new navigable-infact standard, balancing the rights of private property owners to exclude others from entering their land and using the waterway against
the public need to transport property/goods to market.79 The court,
stressing commercial utility, found “that the public ha[s] a right of
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 456.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id.
See Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
Id.
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way in every stream which is capable, in its natural state and its ordinary volume of water, of transporting, in a condition fit for market,
the products of the forests or mines, or of the tillage of the soil upon
its banks.”80 The court also eliminated the vessel requirement by
permitting “the property to be transported” if it could ordinarily float
to market without the human guidance.81 Accordingly, if a waterway
is “navigable or floatable, in its natural state and its ordinary capacity, as to be of public use in the transportation of property, the public
claim to such use ought to be liberally supported.”82
The court also provided an evidentiary standard for determining (1) when a waterway can sufficiently float logs to market and (2)
when a waterway has a sufficient natural capacity to support the public navigation easement.83 First, the proponent of the navigable
easement may show that “the property to be transported” could be
floated along the waterway so long as it could ordinarily float to market without the guidance of man.84 This criterion, just like the reasoning for expanding the English law, stressed the commercial utility
of the waterway because it was necessary that the logs float to market
without being damaged.85 If the logs were capable of floating but
during its course would be rendered unmarketable due to damage,
then the waterway would lack practical utility. Therefore, the public
would not be benefitted and the court would not be justified to interfere with a landowner’s private property by subjecting it to a public
navigable easement. Second, for a river to have sufficient ordinary
capacity to make it useful to the public, it is not necessary “that its
ordinary state, at all seasons of the year, should be such as to make it
navigable.”86 It is only necessary that the “periods of high water or
navigable capacity continue a sufficient length of time to make it useful as a highway.”87
In applying this new, commercially focused standard, the
court analyzed the portion of the Raquette River between Colton and
Raymondsville.88 It held that even under New York’s new “liberal
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
Id.
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 460.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id. at 460.
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rules,” the section of the river at issue could not be found navigable
based on (a) the river not having the ordinary capacity to transport
products for a sufficient amount of time during the year and, (b) even
if it the logs could be safely floated to market, they required the aid
of artificial improvements.89
First, the court determined that the section of the River “was
not capable of floating even single logs, except during seasons of
high water, which were about two months in a year.”90 Additionally,
even during those two months, the river’s rapids and rocks made
floating goods to market so unpredictable that men were required to
aid the logs to ensure that they arrived safely to market.91 The court
stated that “[i]t would be going beyond warrant of either principle or
precedent to hold that a floatable capacity, so temporary, precarious
and unprofitable, constituted the stream a public highway.”92 Second, the court found that it was immaterial that dams were subsequently built along the Raquette River and logs were now capable of
being floated safely to market.93 The court stated that the capacity of
waterway for navigable-in-fact purposes must be analyzed based on
the natural state of the river without consideration of any natural improvements made thereto.94
C.

Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club –
Recreational Use

The New York Court of Appeals reexamined the State’s navigable-in-fact doctrine and evidentiary requirements in Adirondack
League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club.95 The significance of this decision
rests in its holding: “that evidence of [a river’s] capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional test of navigability, that is
whether a river has a practical utility for trade or travel.”96 However,
89

Id.
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 460.
91
Id.
92
Id. This reasoning reflects the Morgan court’s commercial focus in its analysis. The court found that such a short term of two weeks whereby the natural state
of the river could potentially float logs to market did not serve a practical public
utility to justify burdening private land with a public easement.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
96
Id. at 1194 (emphasis added).
90
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this holding unnecessarily expanded New York’s navigable-in-fact
law. First, the court could have reached the same conclusion in overturning the appellate court’s summary judgment order without such a
broad holding. Second, the holding provided a doctrinal foundation
for subsequent lower courts, such as Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v.
Brown,97 to find waterways navigable-in-fact by relying, not on
commerce, but on evidence relating to recreational use.98
In addition, the court in ALC found that recreational use is in
line with the traditional test of navigability by examining if there is
“practical utility for trade or travel.”99 This finding is misguided.
The traditional test in Morgan focused on practical commercial utility, and such utility was determined by whether goods could be transported on a river and thus be traded in the marketplace.100 In Morgan, travelling/floating along the waterway was thus a necessary
condition for the goods/timber to be subsequently traded.101 Nothing
in the Morgan decision lends itself to the proposition that the traditional test looked to the disjunctive, meaning that practical public
utility would be satisfied if goods could be transported or traded on a
river.102 The ALC court’s assurance “that evidence of [a] river’s capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river has practical utility for trade or travel”103 is therefore not an accurate reflection of the navigable-in-fact
doctrine.104 This new practical utility criterion displaces Morgan’s
commercial utility standard with a utility that can be satisfied solely
on travel as a court can now declare a waterway navigable-in-fact
based on a finding that a river can support individual canoeing
trips.105 The remainder of this case discussion will provide: (i) the
facts and procedural background of the case; (ii) the Court of Appeals’ rationale for including recreational use in the navigable-in-fact
97

1 N.Y.S.3d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015).
Id. at 27.
99
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
100
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
101
Id. at 458-59.
102
The Adirondack League Club’s practical utility criterion of trade or travel was
relied on by the court in Friends of Thayer Lake, when it stated that the test of a
waterway’s practical utility “is phrased in the disjunctive,” looking to its capacity
for trade or travel. Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510.
103
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
104
Compare Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
105
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198.
98
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analysis; (iii) an examination of how the court analyzed the evidence,
with particular attention on recreational use; and (iv) how the court’s
holding was unnecessarily broad.
1.

Facts and The Third Department’s Decision

The defendants in ALC made a single recreational trip along
the South Branch of the Moose River (the “South Branch”) by kayak
and canoe.106 The trip began and ended with the defendants entering
land owned by the State of New York, thus the waterway had multiple termini by which the public could gain access without trespassing
onto private land.107 Relevant to the dispute is that twelve miles of
the expedition required the defendants to pass through land owned by
plaintiff Adirondack League Club, Inc. (ALC Inc.).108 According to
the defendants, “about 76% of the segment of the river that runs
through plaintiff’s property is easily paddled by novice canoeists and
the remainder of the river requires intermediate skill.”109 In addition,
the South Branch’s depth varied depending on the season, “with an
average depth of three to four feet.”110
Procedurally, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment arguing that the defendants trespassed on their private property, while
the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the twelve-mile stretch of the South Branch is navigable-in-fact
and, therefore, subject to a public easement.111 The record revealed
106

Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994) [hereinafter ALC App. Div.], aff’d as modified by Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
107
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 790. This fact, although not in dispute in the
case, establishes that the Moose River had multiple termini, and none of which required the defendants to trespass in order to gain access to the waterway. See Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193.
108
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193. The Adirondack League
Club, Inc. is a private club with about four hundred members and for over a century
has sought to exclude the public from navigating the segment of the South Branch
located on its property. ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S. at 789.
109
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added). That novice canoeists could easily paddle the segment of the South Branch at issue. It should
have been analyzed by the court as evidence that the waterway has practical public
utility because it can be enjoyed by recreationalists of all skill levels. See discussion infra Section III.D.iii.
110
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
111
Id.
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that during the first half of the twentieth century the South Branch
had been “one of the five busiest rivers in New York” and was heavily used to transport goods to market.112 In addition, both parties
agreed that the South Branch was used for floating logs to market
during the end of the nineteenth century until 1948.113
However, the natural capacity of the South Branch was in
dispute, as the parties disagreed on whether the pre-1948 commercial
transportation was aided by artificial improvements.114 A network of
dams was built during the turn of the century, but because the remains of only a few of the structures still existed and the parties
failed to present evidence on how the dams were used, there was a
question of fact regarding the natural capacity of the river to float
logs to market.115 The plaintiff, seeking to prove that the South
Branch lacked commercial utility in its natural condition, provided an
affidavit from an historian showing that the historical log-drives on
the South Branch were possible because of the artificial dam system.116 The plaintiff also argued that the log-drives lasted only a few
weeks per year because “the current was unpredictable, and impeded
by rocks and rapids.”117
On the other hand, the defendants argued that the natural capacity of the river was suitable for commercial transportation notwithstanding the construction of the dams.118 The defendants presented log-drive contracts from 1926 to 1948 that prohibited the
construction of dams on the South Branch.119 Additionally, the defendants argued that the historical log-drives lasted only a few weeks
per year because that was all that was bargained for, not because the
river was incapable of additional log-drives.120
The defendants also presented evidence that recreationalists
had recently kayaked the portion of the South Branch at issue.121 The
purpose of the evidence was to show that because the South Branch
could be kayaked for recreational use, the network of dams was not
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Id. at 792.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
Id. at 791-92.
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necessary to enable logs to float safely to market during the pre-1948
log-drives.122 Therefore, the natural state of the river—since it could
support recreational kayaking—could have also supported the logdrives, making the river susceptible to such future commercial use.
The Third Department permitted this evidence and found that recreational use in a navigable-in-fact determination is consistent with New
York’s recent legislative policy of conserving and developing “the
waters of this State for all public beneficial uses, which include use
for recreational purposes.”123
The Appellate Division concluded that the South Branch was
navigable-in-fact and granted the defendants motion for summary
judgment.124 Its determination was based on the “undisputed evidence of the river’s historic use as a major log-driving stream for
some 50 years and its recent use by recreational canoeists.”125 Interestingly, it appears that the court could have based its grant of summary judgment establishing the waterway as navigable-in-fact on one
of two grounds: either the historical log-drives or the recent recreational use of the river.126
2.

The New York Court of Appeals

The issue before the Court of Appeals in ALC was to “what
extent recreational use can be considered in determining whether a

122

Id.
Id. at 791; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0105(2) (McKinney
2016).
124
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792-93.
125
Id. at 792.
126
Id. However, in a subsequent decision by the Third Department, the court
stated that its holding in Adirondack League Club v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 778
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994), “did not alter the established standard for determining
navigability so as to permit a determination of navigability based solely upon a waterway’s suitability and capacity for recreational use.” Hanigan v. State, 629
N.Y.S.2d 509, 512 n.* (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995). Three years after Hanigan,
Judge Bellacosa’s dissent in the New York Court of Appeals decision in Adirondack League Club adds confusion to whether recreational use alone can support a
public navigable easement when he credited the “Appellate Division majority’s
double-barreled justification that . . . the river’s historic use as a major log-driving
stream . . . and its recent use by recreational canoeists” justifies the South Branch’s
navigable-in-fact status. 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 1998) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
123
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river is navigable-in-fact.”127 The plaintiffs predictably argued that
navigability contemplates whether a river has commercial utility, and
the Third Department should have only analyzed the log-drives that
took place on the South Branch until 1948, excluding the evidence
relating to recreational use.128 In that connection, the plaintiffs also
argued that expanding the navigable-in-fact doctrine by allowing evidence of recreational use “would disrupt settled expectations regarding private property and would expand the common-law rule beyond
its traditional foundation.”129
The remainder of this case discussion will examine: (a) the
court’s rationale for including recreational use in a navigable-in-fact
analysis and (b) how the court analyzed the evidence when holding
that summary judgment was improper. It will argue that allowing
recreational use as evidence is not unprecedented, as New York
courts have considered recreational boating in navigability determinations since at least 1960.130 What is new, however, is that the
court’s holding deemphasized the commercial utility aspect of the
navigable-in-fact analysis, and instead measured practical utility on
transportation, whether for trade or travel.131
a.

Recreational Use and The Navigablein-Fact Doctrine

The Court of Appeals first addressed the threshold issue—
whether recreational use could be considered in a navigability determination.132 In holding that it can, the court found “that evidence of
the river’s capacity for recreational use is in line with the traditional
test of navigability, that is, whether a river has practical utility for
trade or travel.”133 This holding, however, is put into question because the court later restated its holding but applied a different practical utility standard.134 The court later stated that it was only holding
127

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1193.
Id. at 1194.
129
Id.
130
See Fairchild, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (“The fact that a stream has been used for
pleasure boating may be considered on the subject of the stream’s capacity and the
use of which it is susceptible.”); Humbach, supra note 50, at 473-74.
131
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
132
Id. at 1193-94.
133
Id. at 1194 (emphasis added).
134
Id. at 1194-96.
128
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“that such transport need not be limited to moving goods in commerce, but can include some recreational uses. Practical utility for
travel or transport remains the standard.”135
The court’s two articulations of its holding are inconsistent as
the former judged practical utility on trade or travel, while the latter
required travel or transport. The latter holding is an even further departure from Morgan’s commercial navigable-in-fact doctrine because it likens public utility to travel or transport, two factors with no
distinction and completely disregards trade—a critical criterion in
Morgan.136 Importantly, a criterion of (a) trade or travel or (b) travel
or transport opens the door to recreational use alone supporting a
navigable-in-fact determination. Without presenting evidence on
whether a waterway is capable of supporting public utility for trade, a
party now seeking to hold a waterway navigable-in-fact can simply
show that he was able to kayak a river when he recreationally traveled from one access point to the other.
In any event, the court reached its holding by applying a modern approach such as, whether a river serves a practical public utility.137 The court stated that when Morgan was decided in 1866, a river’s practical utility was measured by whether it could serve as a
commercial highway to transport goods to market.138 Strictly adhering to the Morgan commercial practical utility criteria would ignore
the fact that trucks have replaced rivers as the primary mode of transporting goods.139 It would also ignore the “changing attitudes toward
the preservation of our natural resources.”140 For example, when
Morgan was decided, rivers were primarily valued as “subjects of
exploitation and gain,” but rivers are now “valued in their own right
as a means of travel.”141
135

Id. at 1196 (emphasis added).
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
137
Id. at 1194-95; Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458.
138
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194-95.
139
Id. at 1195; Brady, supra note 31, at 1426-27 (stating that because waterways
are no longer a primary method of transporting goods to market, “courts that measure navigability by floating logs are thus left with a definition that bears no relationship to actual or future use of waters”).
140
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
141
Id. It is doubtful that rivers are now valued for traveling but were not when
Morgan was decided in 1866. The court in Morgan focused on the type of traveling at issue, i.e., commercial, when it expanded the navigable-in-fact doctrine to the
detriment of private property rights. Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459. The court in ALC,
136
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The court also rejected ALC Inc.’s. argument that Morgan
supports the conclusion that the sole factor in determining whether a
waterway is navigable-in-fact is whether it is capable of carrying
goods to market.142 The court explained that Morgan and the Navigation Law definition “have as their touchstone the idea that a river
must have ‘practical usefulness to the public as a highway for transportation.’”143 In addition, the fact that Morgan measured a river’s
“capacity for getting material to market does not restrict the concept
of usefulness for transport to the movement of commodities.”144 Accordingly, “the concept of usefulness for transport” must include the
movement of people as rivers no longer serve as a primary method of
moving commodities.145
The court’s rationale for including travel as a guideline for determining if a waterway has practical public utility is unsound and it
may have unintentionally expanded the scope of the navigable-in-fact
doctrine to the detriment of private property rights. First, the court
used New York’s current statutory Navigation Law definition of navigability as persuasive authority when interpreting a common-law
doctrine originating in 1866.146 Second, and of greater significance,
the court overlooked the importance that Morgan placed on commercial utility when the Morgan court expanded the navigable easement
to include floating logs. The court in ALC found even though “evolving necessities and circumstances may warrant a different emphasis
regarding a river’s usefulness, the central premise of the common-law
remains the same—in order to be navigable-in-fact, a river must provide practical utility to the public as a means for transportation.”147
This reasoning; however, does not accurately reflect the central premise of the common law as understood by the court in Morgan nor
does the law remain the same after its decision. In Morgan the central premise was the navigable-in-fact doctrine needed to include

however, failed to distinguish the practical public utility between commercial travel
and recreational travel when finding that “recreational use can be considered in addition to commercial use” in a navigable-in-fact analysis. Adirondack League Club,
Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1196.
142
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
143
Id. (quoting N.Y. NAV. LAW §2 (5) (McKinney 2016)).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
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floatability to further commerce.148 In ALC; however, the central
premise is that Morgan is outdated as rivers no longer serve as commercial highways.149 Thus, evidence of a river’s capacity to support
recreational use is relevant to determine whether a waterway has
practical utility for transportation. By solely focusing on transportation, the court in ALC misinterprets the traditional premise of the
common law established in Morgan—that transportation on a waterway furthered the public’s ability to trade goods. The central premise
of Morgan, even with a liberal interpretation, cannot be construed to
mean that a waterway serves a practical public utility if it has the capacity to enable transportation for the purpose of travelling along it.
b.

Analysis of the Evidence

The ALC court evaluated the South Branch’s navigability
based on its new criterion: whether the river has practical utility for
trade or travel.150 The court first analyzed the waterway’s practical
utility for trade by examining the historical log-drive evidence.151
The court found that the evidence in the record conflicted on the issue
of whether “artificial means were necessary to render the South
Branch capable of commercial use.”152 Accordingly, the court concluded that it could not find as a matter of law whether the network of
dams was necessary to accomplish the pre-1948 log-drives, meaning
that the evidence was insufficient “to compel a conclusion that practical, commercial use of the South Branch occurred in its natural state
and its ordinary volume.”153
The court next addressed whether the South Branch could
support unobstructed travel either periodically or seasonally based on
the evidence of defendants’ recreational canoeing and kayaking
trip.154 The court concluded that this evidence was insufficient, finding that the single recreational trip was “not enough to demonstrate
that the river periodically has sufficient natural volume for a sufficient portion of the year to make it useful as a means for transporta148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1195.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1194.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id.
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tion.”155 In addition, there was conflicting evidence regarding “(a)
the river’s ability to sustain commercial boating or canoeing operations or (b) its capacity to float individual canoeing excursions for
any given period or season.”156
Although the court did not hold the South Branch was navigable as a matter of law, the court’s analysis supports the position
that recreational use alone is now sufficient to declare a waterway
over private property navigable-in-fact. For example, the court first
found that the historical log-drive evidence could not support the
conclusion that the commercial activity along the South Branch occurred in the river’s “natural state and its ordinary volume.”157 This
is a required factor under the Morgan navigable-in-fact analysis, and
had the court strictly followed Morgan, this finding alone could have
compelled the court to hold that summary judgment was improper.
Instead, the court continued its analysis by examining the recreational
use evidence to determine if the South Branch could support unobstructed travel either seasonally or periodically—another element required under Morgan.158 The fact that the court continued its analysis
demonstrates that the court’s holding and overall reasoning are not
truly “in line with the traditional test of navigability.”159 Rather, a
party may now seek to have a waterway declared navigable-in-fact
without showing that the natural state of a river could support practical commercial use, but may instead demonstrate that only unobstructed travel can occur on the river, even if such travel is evidence
of “individual canoeing excursions for any given period or season.”160
Accordingly, the ALC decision permits courts to now find a waterway navigable-in-fact based on evidence showing that the natural capacity of the waterway permits individual canoeing trips for a sufficient period of time throughout the year.
The mode of analysis used by the court in ALC, with respect
to recreational use, also differed from the analysis of recreational use
by the lower appellate court and other New York courts have analyzed recreational use. For example, the Third Department in ALC
examined recreational use to determine if the natural state and ordi155
156
157
158
159
160

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198.
Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id. at 1194.
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198.
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nary volume of the South Branch had the capacity to support the historical log-drives without the need of dams.161 In contrast, the Court
of Appeals considered the historical log-drives on the issue of the
river’s “natural state and ordinary volume,” and elected to examine
the evidence of recreational use on another element, that is, whether
“substantially unobstructed travel on the South Branch [could] occur
periodically or seasonally.”162
The Court of Appeals in ALC also expanded New York appellate court precedent in connection with how recreational use is evaluated. For example, in Fairchild v. Kraemer,,163 the Appellate Division, Second Department considered evidence of recreational use
when determining if the waterway at issue was navigable-in-fact.164
The court stated that “pleasure boating may be considered on the subject of the stream’s capacity and the use of which it is susceptible.”165
Evidence of pleasure boating, the court stated, could be used by the
proponent of the navigable public easement to show that the natural
state or condition of the waterway was susceptible to “trade, commerce or travel.”166 Thus, the court in Fairchild would have examined evidence of recreation use on the issue of whether the natural
state of the subject waterway had the capacity for a commercial purpose. In addition, the Appellate Division, Third Department in Mohawk Valley Ski Club v. Town of Duanesburg167 found the fact that a
pond had “been used to float canoes and small boats for purely recreational purposes . . . insufficient to demonstrate that the pond has any
capacity or suitability for commercial transportation.”168 Both of these examples considered recreational use on the issue of whether the
waterway was susceptible of supporting a commercial purpose, but
neither went as far as the court in ALC, which would have declared
161
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792. The Third Department found that the
South Branch’s “capacity for floating logs [was] supported by the recreational use
of the river by canoeists.” Id.
162
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1197.
163
Kraemer, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
164
Id. at 826.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 826.
167
Mohawk, 757 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
168
Id. at 360 (emphasis added). The court in Mohawk Valley Ski Club found that
the pond at issue was not navigable-in-fact because it lacked multiple termini by
which the public may enter or leave the waterway and, therefore, lacked utility as a
means of transportation. Id.
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the South Branch navigable-in-fact based on its “capacity to float individual canoeing excursions for any given period or season.”169
D.

Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown

In 2015, the Appellate Division, Third Department in Friends
of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment by holding that the waterway at issue was “navigable-in-fact and subject to a public right of navigation.”170 Like
ALC, this case involved recreational canoeists who entered private
property in order to use the waterway.171 The court’s analysis of recreational use relied significantly on ALC to support its conclusion that
the waterway was navigable-in-fact.172 In addition, the court’s evaluation of the evidence greatly expanded the concept of “practical utility,”173 thus making it easier for the proponent of a public easement to
establish that a waterway is navigable-in-fact with recreational use
evidence.
1.

Factual Background

In 1851, the State of New York conveyed thousands of acres
of land to Benjamin Brandreth, an ancestor of the plaintiffs in
Friends of Thayer Lake.174 The Brandreth property, commonly referred to as Mud Pond Parcel,175 is located in a secluded area of the
Adirondack Mountains and has remained in plaintiffs’ family since
the time of its conveyance.176 Mud Pond Parcel is surrounded by
20,000 acres of forest preserve land known as the William C. Whitney Wilderness Area (Wilderness Area).177 Until 1998, the Wilderness Area was privately owned and therefore off-limits to the pub-

169

Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1198.
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512.
171
Id. at 506.
172
Id. at 508-11.
173
Id. at 511 (stating that “recreational and commercial uses are often intertwined” when considering “modern view[s] of a waterway’s utility”).
174
Id. at 506.
175
Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, No. 6803, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Hamilton Cty. Feb. 25, 2013).
176
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 506.
177
Id.
170
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lic.178 In 1998; however, New York State acquired the Wilderness
Area and opened the preserve to the public.179 As a result, the public
now had the ability to canoe on a network of waterways located within the Wilderness Area known as the Lila Traverse without first having to trespass over private property to gain access.180
The focus in Friends of Thayer Lake involved a system of
streams known as the Mud Pond Waterway (the Waterway), which
runs across the northern edge of plaintiffs’ private property, Mud
Pond Parcel.181 The Waterway connects two smaller bodies of water,
Shingle Shanty Brook to the west and Lilypad Pond to the east, both
of which are part of the Lila Traverse.182 After the Wilderness Area
became public, the Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC) created a public carry-trail between Shingle Shanty Brook and
Lilypad Pond so that canoers could navigate the Lila Traverse without having to trespass onto plaintiffs’ private parcel.183
In 2009, defendant Phil Brown, editor of a magazine called
the Adirondack Explorer, set out on a two-day canoe trip to investigate whether the Waterway running through Mud Pond Parcel was
navigable-in-fact.184 Brown subsequently published an article in his
magazine that documented his trip.185 The article, appropriately entitled “Testing the Legal Waters,” concluded that the Waterway is, in
fact, navigable and therefore should be open to the public.186
Brown began his recreational canoeing trip at a public access
point on Little Tupper Lake, located in the northeasterly portion of
the land formerly known as the “William C. Whitney Wilderness Area,” and headed west on the Lila Traverse.187 After a day and a half
of travel, Brown reached Lilypad Pond.188 Just to reach Lilypad
Pond, Brown was required to make at least three portages where the
178

Id.
Id.
180
Id.
181
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 506.
182
Id.
183
Id. A carry trail permits paddlers to carry their canoes on-foot wherever the
water becomes too rough or too shallow to paddle through.
184
Id. at 507.
185
Id.
186
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 507.
187
See Phil Brown, Testing the Legal Waters, ADIRONDACK EXPLORER (Aug. 24,
2009), http://www.adirondackexplorer.org/stories/testing-the-legal-waters.
188
Brown, supra note 187, at 6.
179
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Lila Traverse was not navigable, the longest being 1.75 miles.189
When arriving at Lilypad Pond, Brown elected not to use the statecreated carry-trail, which avoided plaintiffs’ private land, and instead
decided to paddle past the no trespassing signs and into the Waterway.190 Brown admitted that a stretch of rapids made the Waterway
impassable for about 500 feet, but he was able to portage around this
section on a carry trail that the plaintiffs had constructed for their
own use.191 Other than this portion, the Waterway, in Brown’s opinion, “[was] obviously navigable in the everyday sense of the
word.”192 Brown summed up his expedition writing, “[o]rdinarily,
the trip requires four long carries, but I did it in just three . . . I avoided [the last carry] by canoeing through private land from Lilypad to
Mud Pond and down the Mud Pond outlet to Shingle Shanty.”193
2.

Procedural History & Third Department’s
Decision

After learning of Brown’s trip, plaintiffs filed suit “seeking
compensatory damages for trespass and a declaratory judgment that
the Waterway is not navigable-in-fact.”194 Brown answered and asserted a number of affirmative defenses, primarily that the State was
a necessary party.195 The Supreme Court for the County of Hamilton
allowed New York State and the DEC to intervene as defendants.196
The State defendants asserted that the Waterway is navigable-in-fact
and sought an injunction to bar plaintiffs from interfering with travel
on the Waterway.197 Both parties subsequently moved for summary
judgment.198
189

Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 514 (Rose, J., dissenting).
Id. at 507.
191
Id.
192
See Brown, supra note 187.
193
See Brown, supra note 187.
194
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 507.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. Both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division stated in their opinions that they would have been inclined to “find triable issues of fact as to the navigable character of the Waterway, but did not do so because the parties had asked
the court to render a determination as a matter of law.” Friends of Thayer Lake, 1
N.Y.S.3d at 507. The Supreme Court pointed out one particular issue of fact that
existed: “the weight to place upon the size and characteristics of the undisputed 500
190

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [2016], Art. 3

480

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

The Supreme Court held that the Waterway is navigable-infact and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment.199 The
court further found that plaintiffs had created a public nuisance by
posting steel cables, no trespassing signs, and motion cameras along
the boundary, and enjoined them from interfering with the public
right of navigation.200
Plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Appellate Division for the
Third Judicial Department.201 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that only
evidence of commercial utility can be considered to prove navigability.202 Defendants argued that under the New York Court of Appeals’
decision in ALC, evidence of recreational use may also be considered
in the test for navigability.203
The appellate court began its discussion by relying on ALC
and explained that a waterway’s navigability must be determined
based upon evidence of “its utility for travel or trade.”204 Applying
this standard, the Friends of Thayer Lake court considered evidence
in the form of testimony, affidavits, photographs, historical records,
travel guidebooks, and maps.205 The court found particularly important the testimony of Donald Brandreth Potter, a member of plaintiffs’ family, and someone “who has lifelong familiarity with the Waterway and its history.”206 Potter testified that even though the
Waterway “is shallow in some areas and narrow, tortuous and crowded with plant growth in others, it is ‘generally floatable by canoe’
during periods of ordinary water.’”207 On the other hand, Potter stated that “[t]he rapids below Mud Pond are an exception . . . [and are]

foot portage around the [Waterway] when determining navigability.” Friends of
Thayer Lake, No. 6803, slip op. at 2-3.
199
Friends of Thayer Lake, No. 6803, slip op. at 5.
200
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 512.
201
Id. at 507.
202
Brief for the Respondent at 7, Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, (No.
518309), 2014 WL 10022708.
203
Id.
204
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509. Previously, this determination
turned on the waterway’s ability to support commercial transportation, but in Adirondack League Club the Court of Appeals clarified that recreational use can also
be considered as a factor in a navigable-in-fact determination. Adirondack League
Club, 706 N.E.2d at 1196.
205
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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never canoeable.”208 He explained that this section of the Waterway
was not navigable and that his family built and maintains a “500-foot
carry trail” to avoid the Mud Pond rapids.209 Accordingly, the court
concluded that Potter’s testimony established that the Waterway “is
capable of canoe travel” and, therefore, “has sufficient natural volume for a sufficient portion of the year to make it useful as a means
for transportation.”210 In other words, the court found that Potter’s
testimony demonstrated that the Waterway has practical utility for
travel. It did not matter that the rapids below Mud Pond were never
navigable. On this evidence, the court found that the “relatively short
Mud Pond rapids” did not render the Waterway non-navigable because “occasional natural obstructions do not destroy the navigability
of a waterway.”211 In these circumstances, the navigable easement
“gives rise to a public right to circumvent [the natural obstacle] by
making use . . . of the beds and banks, including the right to portage
on riparian lands.”212
The court then examined whether the Waterway has practical
utility for trade by discussing its actual and susceptible uses.213 Plaintiffs stated that the Brandreth family only used the Waterway for private, recreational purposes, and argued that this should preclude a
finding of navigability-in-fact.214 The court disagreed on the ground
that the ALC test examines a waterway’s capacity for use, not just its
actual use.215
The court, in analyzing the actual and susceptible uses of the
Waterway, began by noting that the plaintiffs’ property is located in a
remote area without nearby roads, and that the plaintiffs have “always relied on the Waterway as a primary means of traveling to Mud
208

Id.
Id.
210
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509.
211
Id. at 510.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 510-11. It appears that this part of the court’s analysis is unnecessary.
The navigable-in-fact standard established by the Court of Appeals in Adirondack
League Club is whether a waterway “has practical utility for trade or travel.” Adirondack League Club, 706 N.E.2d at 600. Once the court in Friends of Thayer
Lake found that the Mud Pond had practical utility for transportation, the court
could have declared the waterway navigable-in-fact without having to discuss
whether Mud Pond has practical utility for trade. Id.
214
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510.
215
Id. at 511.
209
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Pond Camp from other parts of their property.”216 Although much of
the actual use involved recreational hunting or fishing, the court
found that that the family “also regularly used the Waterway for such
utilitarian purposes as transporting goods and supplies to Mud Pond
Camp.”217 For example, Potter’s testimony revealed that the family
used the Waterway to transport, inter alia, “food, baggage, equipment, bed, a stove and building materials” from the area now comprised of the Wilderness Area southward until reaching their property.218 The court stated that even though the plaintiffs had used
Waterway for their own private purposes, the evidence sufficiently
demonstrated that the Waterway “has the capacity to transport similar
goods for commercial purposes.”219 The court also noted that recreational and commercial uses are today often intertwined, as demonstrated by the “testimony of the owner of an Adirondack outfitting
and guide service, who stated that . . . he will include the Waterway
in his commercial activity if it is judicially declared to be navigablein-fact.”220
3.

Practical Utility and The Implications of the
Third Department’s Decision in Friends of
Thayer Lake

The court’s analysis and conclusion that the Waterway has
capacity for trade substantially expands the common, everyday meaning of the term “practical utility.”221 The court found that “recreational and commercial uses are often intertwined” based on evidence
presented by the owner of an Adirondack tour guide company, who
stated that he would include the Waterway in his business “if it is declared to be navigable-in-fact.”222 While it is true that commercial
216

Id. at 510.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 511.
220
Id. Even assuming, as the majority did, that recreational use today can constitute evidence of a waterway’s capacity for commercial utility, the Waterway in
Friends of Thayer Lake is still impracticable for such use because of its isolated nature and the lengthy trek required to reach it. Further, in the middle of the wilderness, without the availability of emergency medical assistance or even public bathrooms such a commercial operation would likely pose substantial safety risks. Id.
221
Id. at 509.
222
Id. at 511.
217
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and recreational can be intertwined in the proper case, the facts presented in Friends of Thayer Lake do not compel such a conclusion.
Practical utility has not been defined by the courts, therefore the term
should be understood in its ordinary meaning without forced construction.223 In that connection, “practical” is commonly understood
to mean “what is real rather than what is possible or imagined,”224
while “utility” is defined as something with “the quality or state of
being useful.”225 However, the court in Friends of Thayer Lake expanded the concept of “practical utility” with respect to capacity for
commercial use far beyond the term’s ordinary meaning of something
that actually provides or is readily susceptible of providing the general public with meaningful or useful commerce.226 It is doubtful,
even with a liberal application of the navigable-in-fact doctrine,227
that meaningful commerce can be conducted by a business providing
kayaking expeditions through the Mud Pond Waterway. First, the
Waterway is in a remote area, and plaintiff’s property, located in the
Town of Long Lake, Hamilton County, has a population of just over
700 people.228 Second, the Waterway is not easily accessible to the
public.229 The court noted that, “access to the Waterway remains difficult, requiring lengthy canoe travel across the Wilderness Area on
various component lakes and streams of the Lila Traverse and several
portages, the longest of which covers 1.75 miles.”230 As noted by the
dissent, these conditions require that any recreationalist travelling
along the Lila Traverse “must necessarily [be] physically fit and
223

Cf. N.Y. STAT. Law § 94 (McKinney 2016) (stating that when interpreting a
statute, words are to be construed in their “natural and obvious sense, without resort
to forced construction”).
224
Practical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/practical (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
225
See Utility, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/utility (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
226
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509.
227
See, e.g., Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459 (stating that when a waterway is “so far
navigable or floatable, in its natural state and ordinary capacity, as to be of public
use in the transportation of property, the public claim to such use ought to be liberally supported”) (emphasis added).
228
Profile of General Population & Housing Characteristics: 2010 – Long Lake
Town,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk
(last visited May 3, 2016).
229
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 514.
230
Id. at 511.
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equipped with the necessary gear to paddle and portage through the
remote backcountry over the course of multiple days.”231 Thus, the
remote location of both the Waterway and plaintiffs’ property, the
fact that very few people live in the Town of Long Lake, along with
the difficulty of even accessing Mud Pond, weaken the court’s conclusion that the Waterway has practical public utility for trade.232 It
is unlikely that the Waterway is capable of serving much, if any,
practical public utility when only 711 people live in the area surrounding plaintiffs’ remote property.233 Likewise, even those who
wish to travel along the Lila Traverse must be in excellent physical
condition to even reach the Waterway, thus lessening the number of
persons who would benefit from the public navigable servitude.
However, the rationale employed by the court in Friends of Thayer
Lake stretches the concept of practical utility whereby a waterway
may be found to have public utility even under circumstances where
only a marginal segment of the population would benefit from the
navigable-in-fact determination.234 The fact that an outdoor expedition company can now hypothetically conduct a kayaking business
comprised solely of physically fit customers willing to kayak in a remote area significantly jeopardizes any expectation landowners have
to exclude others from using a waterway on their private property.
The Friends of Thayer Lake navigable-in-fact determination
should also be alarming to private property owners because the court
failed to acknowledge critical differences in the facts at issue with the
facts presented to the court in ALC. For example, the court in
Friends of Thayer Lake—without much discussion—dismissed the
“[p]laintiffs’ arguments pertaining to the Waterway’s remote nature.”235 Instead, the court simply stated that the navigable-in-fact
doctrine “is more concerned with a waterway’s capacity and characteristics than its location”236; however, the only characteristic the
court used to support the Waterway’s navigable-in-fact status was
based on the multiple termini from which the public can gain access.237 The location of a waterway in navigable-in-fact cases, alt231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id. at 515 (Rose, J., dissenting).
Id. at 516 (Rose, J., dissenting).
Id. at 516-17 (Rose, J., dissenting).
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 517 (Rose, J., dissenting).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 511-12.
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hough not a controlling factor in New York precedent, has generally
been on private property in high population areas and the subject waterway typically provides or had at one point served as a highway for
commerce.238 In comparison, although the court in ALC could not
conclude as a matter of law that the subject waterway, the South
Branch, was navigable-in-fact, it was agreed that the South Branch
had once been “one of the five busiest rivers in New York for the
transport of logs.”239 The South Branch’s location as a major commercial highway, a factor important to the Appellate Division, Third
Department,240 advances the position that the location of a waterway
strengthens the public’s right to a navigable easement because of the
waterway’s utility as a beneficial highway for trade.241 The Waterway in Friends of Thayer Lake; however, is located in a remote area
and the Waterway never served the public with practical utility.242
The court in Friends of Thayer Lake analysis, or lack thereof, of the
location of the Mud Pond in the navigable-in-fact analysis and its decision to not treat a waterway’s location as a relevant characteristic
should cause concern to private property owners.243 Reliance on this
decision by subsequent courts jeopardizes private property rights, as
waterways may now be found navigable-in-fact regardless of location
and with only marginal evidence showing that the waterway serves a
practical public utility for commerce.
The effort required to reach the Mud Pond Waterway was also

238

See, e.g., Palmer, 3 Cai. at 310 (involving a dispute over whether the defendants committed a nuisance by building a dam along the Hudson River). The Hudson River, unlike the Mud Pond in Friends of Thayer Lake, historically has been
linked to public travel and commerce. For example, Cadwallader Colden, a surveyor in the English province of New York in 1724, commented that the natural
conditions of the Hudson River enabled vessels to “always sail as well by night as
by day, and [has] the advantage of the tide upwards as well as downwards.”
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, WEDDING OF THE WATERS: THE ERIE CANAL AND THE
MAKING OF A GREAT NATION 49, 51 (2005). Likewise, the Hudson River served as
an artery of commerce connecting Albany and New York City, two populated cities, by only 150 miles. Id. at 51; see also Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 455-56 (stating that
the one hundred sixty mile long Raquette River connected towns located in the Adirondack Region in upstate New York).
239
Adirondack League Club, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 1195.
240
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
241
Id. at 792-93.
242
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 510.
243
Id. at 508-11.
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not a detriment to the court in Friends of Thayer Lake,244 thus making
it easier for a proponent to establish that a river is navigable-in-fact.
As previously noted, accessing the Waterway is difficult as the public
is required to undergo “lengthy canoe travel across the Wilderness
Area . . . and several portages, the longest of which covers 1.75
miles.”245 Thus, those members of the public wishing to travel the
Lila Traverse must be physically fit and have a high level of skill to
even reach Mud Pond Parcel. On the other hand, the facts presented
in ALC is more in line with the common understanding of practical
public utility for trade as it relates to operating a recreational
kayaking business. In ALC, over three-fourths of the South Branch
that passed “through plaintiff’s property is easily paddled by novice
canoeists and the remainder of the river requires intermediate
skill.”246 Accordingly, even though the New York Court of Appeals
in ALC did not find the South Branch navigable-in-fact as a matter of
law, the segment of the river had the capability of benefitting a wide
range of the public as even novice recreationalists were capable of
paddling it.247 This in contrast with Friends of Thayer Lake where
the court held the Mud Pond Waterway navigable-in-fact on a motion
for summary judgment, even though the waterway had the capability
of providing utility to only highly skilled canoeists.248
IV.

CONCLUSION

Navigable-in-fact waterways located on private property subject the realty to a navigable easement in favor of the public. This
doctrine first gained attention in 1866 by the New York Court of Appeals in Morgan v. King where the court established New York’s
navigable-in-fact common law.249 The court in Morgan expanded the
doctrine from its English common law roots to permit a waterway to
be subject to a public navigable easement upon a showing that the
natural state of a river had the capacity to float logs in a condition fit
for market.250 Although the court expanded on English law, the court
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Id. at 511.
Id.
ALC App. Div., 615 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
Id.
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 509-10.
Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 459.
Id.
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carefully balanced the benefit to the public should the waterway be
declared navigable against the detriment to the landowner by subjecting the property to a public easement.251
The careful balance employed by the court in Morgan; however, has been abandoned. In Friends of Thayer Lake, the court
found that recreational use may be used as evidence to establish that a
waterway has the capacity to support commercial recreational business.252 While this finding may not seem significant as whitewater
rafting is a popular recreational activity, the facts in Friends of
Thayer Lake disrupt any settled expectations that landowners have to
exclude others from their private property. In that case, the court
held as a matter of law that a waterway located on the private property in a remote area and without any actual history of being used as a
highway for commerce as navigable-in-fact.253 Accordingly, this sets
a precedent for a waterway to be declared navigable-in-fact regardless of its location.
The Third Department’s decision in Friends of Thayer Lake
has been granted appeal by the New York Court of Appeals and oral
argument was made in March 2016.254 The court should take this opportunity to reexamine its precedent and begin considering the location of the waterway in its navigable-in-fact analysis. This will help
rebalance the public’s interest in using waterways for recreation
against a landowner’s expectation to exclude others from the realty.
For example, when weighing the public interest against the landowner’s interest, the court can find that the public utility of burdening
private property with a navigable easement is greater when the waterway is located in densely populated areas than when the property
is located in remote areas. At the same time, the landowners’ expectation of excluding the public from travelling on waterways situated
on their property is highest when the property is in a secluded area
isolated from others and lowest when it is readily accessible to a large
segment of the population.
It is unlikely that the Court of Appeals will take this opportunity to rebalance New York’s navigable-in-fact law. It is also im251

Id. at 461.
Friends of Thayer Lake, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 511.
253
Id. at 510-11.
254
Oral
Argument
Archive,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2016/Mar16/Mar16_OA.htm (last visited May 6, 2016).
252

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [2016], Art. 3

488

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

probable that the court will reverse the Third Department’s decision
in Friends of Thayer Lake as the appellate court was following the
precedent established by the Court of Appeals in ALC.255 Likewise, it
is doubtful that the legislature will intervene as it is New York’s policy “to develop and manage the basic resources of water . . . to the end
that the state may fulfill its responsibility as trustee of the environment for the present and future generations.”256 This responsibility
likewise includes the duty of assuring the greatest range “of beneficial uses of the environment . . . .”257 Thus, a judicial determination
that a waterway is navigable-in-fact means that the state of New York
holds the water in trust with a duty to preserve the waterway for the
widest range of beneficial uses, which includes recreation.258 Accordingly, without a drastic change in approach by the New York
Court of Appeals when it reviews the Third Department’s determination in Friends of Thayer Lake, landowners should expect their property to be burdened with a navigable public easement.

255

706 N.E.2d at 1194 (holding that recreational use evidence “is in line with the
traditional test of navigability, that is, whether a river has a practical utility for
trade or travel”).
256
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101(2) (McKinney 2016).
257
Id. § 1-0101(3)(b).
258
Id. § 15-2701.
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